STATE OF MAINE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION Docket No. 2006-513

December 18, 2006

MAINE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION Standard Offer Bidding Procedure For Customers of Maine Public Service Company ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION AND DESIGNATING STANDARD OFFER PROVIDER

ADAMS, Chairman; REISHUS, Commis	ORIGINAL ORIGINAL
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Through this Order, we grant the petitions for reconsideration of WPSE FROM FILE Energy Services. Inc. (WPS) and Loring BioEnergy LLC (LBE), and designate WPS as the standard offer provider for all customer classes in the Maine Public Service Company (MPS) service territory for the 26 month period beginning January 1, 2007.

## II. BACKGROUND

I.

On September 15, 2006, the Commission issued a request for proposals (RFP) to provide standard offer service to all customer classes in MPS's territory. The RFP sought bids of 26 months and 50 months for the residential and small commercial class and bids of 14 months for the medium and large classes. As required by the RFP, indicative bids were provided on October 5, 2006. After a review of bids and discussion on non-price terms, the Commission asked that binding bids be submitted on November 14, 2006.

During its deliberations on November 14, 2006, the Commission rejected the bids, stating that the solicitation process produced two bids from a single bidder (a 26 month bid and a 10 year bid). In its Order rejecting the bids, the Commission explained:

Participation by a single bidder is contradictory to the basic premise of the standard offer solicitation process. The process is intended to provide thbenefits of competition for those customers who do not or can not obtain electricity supply directly from the competitive market. A solicitation process that yields only one bidder cannot be considered competitive and frustrates the purposes of the standard offer process. In addition, the lack of competing bids makes it extremely difficult to

determine whether the prices are reasonable and in the public interest. It is for these reasons that we reject the bids and terminate our solicitation process.

Order Rejecting Standard Offer Bids And Directing MPS To Provide Standard Offer Service, Docket No. 2006-513 (Nov. 16, 2006). Consistent with the process in our standard offer rule, Ch. 301, § 7(D)(2), we directed MPS to procure standard offer through wholesale arrangements and to provide standard offer service to its customers for a 14 month period beginning January 1, 2007. The Commission also initiated an Inquiry to consider possible long-term solutions to the lack of competition in northern Maine.

On December 4, 2006, WPS filed a petition for reconsideration, arguing that the process was sufficiently competitive and the rejection of the bids may lead to higher rates for customers. WPS urged the Commission to reconsider its Order and award standard offer supply based on the retail bids it received. On December 6, 2006, Loring BioEnergy LLC (LBE) filed a request for reconsideration, generally supporting the arguments and positions of WPS. In compliance with the Commission's November 16, 2006 Order, MPS, on December 15, 2006, filed its recommendations regarding standard offer wholesale supply arrangements and corresponding standard offer rates.

# III. DECISION

We grant the petitions for reconsideration of WPS and LBE, reopen the bid process that was terminated on November 16, 2006, and designate WPS as the standard offer provider for all customer classes in the Maine Public Service Company (MPS) service territory for the 26 month period beginning January 1, 2007. The standard offer prices vary among the classes and change over the 26 month term. Additionally, as we discuss below, the accepted bid contains a condition that would allow for the prices to increase based on the future imposition of a capacity requirement in northern Maine (either through a market rule change or a FERC finding that current market rules impose such a condition). Attachment A contains the accepted standard offer prices, including the maximum prices that may occur as a result of the capacity requirement contingency.

As explained in our November 16<sup>th</sup> Order, we rejected the standard offer bids because of market failure in northern Maine. The participation by a single

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Commission also noted that the longer term bid was not in acceptable form even if submitted in a competitive context, because it placed significant risks (i.e. fuel price and plant efficiency) on the consumers and did not sufficiently address financial security issues. In addition, because we did not ask for long-term bids in this solicitation, there were no competing proposals, thus making it difficult to analyze.

bidder indicated that there was not enough activity to ensure that customers would receive a price that was reasonably reflective of competition. Our view is that the northern Maine market, as currently constructed, is too small and isolated to support a competitive market. It is for these reasons that we rejected the bids.

When we rejected the bids and directed MPS to supply the standard offer through wholesale arrangements, we took a risk that the prices could be higher than the rejected bid prices. The petitions for reconsideration allowed us to compare the ultimate prices consumers would pay under the retail bids with that which would result from MPS providing the service. This comparison revealed that prices would be significantly higher if MPS provided standard offer service through its wholesale arrangements. In addition, WPS lowered its retail bid somewhat on reconsideration. When we rejected the bids, our intent was to commit to standard offer arrangements for a short term to provide time to consider longer term solutions. The acceptance of WPS's 26 month retail bid serves the purpose of providing a transition or a bridge to the longer term at the lowest possible cost to consumers and, it is for this reason, that we reconsider our November 16<sup>th</sup> Order and accept WPS's 26 month retail bid.

We do not consider the WPS long-term bid (ten years) because adoption of that bid would effectively preempt or short-circuit our efforts to consider all possible longer term solutions to the northern Maine market problems. By accepting the WPS short-term bid, we do not suggest in any way a view that the northern Maine market has been vindicated or that the status quo may be maintained indefinitely. In addition, our decision should not in any way be interpreted as conferring antitrust immunity on any party, or otherwise estopping any appropriate investigation and enforcement activity.

The WPS bid included bidder conditions that are contained in Attachment B to this Order.<sup>3</sup> We hereby accept these bidder conditions and incorporate them into this Order. As mention above, the WPS bid included a condition that would allow for a price change to reflect costs resulting from the imposition of a capacity requirement in northern Maine through a FERC finding or a market rule change. In such an event, standard offer prices would increase as determined

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> We acknowledge the enormous effort of MPS in putting together a portfolio of wholesale arrangements on such short notice. Consistent with Chapter 301, § 9(D), MPS may defer for later recovery all incremental costs involved in its effort to secure standard offer supply.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> We also attach to this Order WPS's Statement of Commitment (Attachment C) that binds WPS to the provision of standard offer service according to the terms of its bid.

by the Commission up to a capped amount stated in the bidder conditions.<sup>4</sup> Under the current circumstances, we find the WPS capacity requirement contingencies to be acceptable.<sup>5</sup> We also note that WPS did not propose any changes to standard offer provider standard service agreement and we therefore direct WPS and MPS to execute the standard agreement upon issuance of this Order.

Our request for standard offer bids and the standard contract incorporate a "margining" approach to financial security in which the amount of security to be posted by the supplier varies with market conditions and the amount of expected standard offer load. MPS has agreed to perform the margining function. We recognize that Chapter 301 does not require utilities to perform margining functions with respect to standard offer service and that such a margining function imposes additional risk on T&D utilities. We explicitly find that MPS shareholders shall not be subject to any prudency risk or financial liability with respect to its margining activities related to standard offer service for any actions it takes and decisions that it makes in the ordinary course of business of managing the margining requirements, as long as it takes reasonable steps to inform the Commission of its activities in this regard. <sup>6</sup> To the extent that any other person or entities seek to impose any such prudency risk or liability on MPS in contravention to the previous sentence, any resulting direct or indirect costs, obligations, expenses or damages incurred by MPS shall be fully recovered, with carrying costs, from customers either through utility rates or standard offer prices.

Similarly, we also recognize that the bidder conditions approved in this Order may create certain risks and obligations for MPS. Risks imposed by the bidder conditions are properly borne by customers and not shareholders. Therefore, we explicitly find that any direct or indirect costs, obligations, expenses or damages reasonably incurred by MPS in fulfilling its contractual obligations or exercising its contractual rights under the standard agreement, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The WPS bidder conditions included two possible types of capacity requirements: 1) installed capacity obligation; and 2) available capacity obligation. The capped prices differ depending on the type of capacity requirement that is imposed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> We have generally found such contingencies not to be acceptable and have preferred that suppliers take the risk of changes in FERC jurisdictional market rules. Our decision to accept the market rule change contingencies under the circumstances of this case does not indicate a change in our general practice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The reasonable steps will include, but not be limited to, weekly e-mail communications from the MPS to Commission Staff reporting current market prices and MPS's calculation of Excess Market Exposure.

in satisfying the bidder conditions we have accepted, shall be fully recovered, with carrying costs, from customers either through utility rates or standard offer prices.

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 18th day of December, 2006.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

Karen Geraghty Administrative Director

COMMISSIONERS VOTING FOR:

Adams

Reishus

STATE OF MAINE
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Docket No. 2006-513

November 16, 2006

MAINE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION Standard Offer Bidding Procedure For Customers of Maine Public Service Company ORDER REJECTING STANDARD OFFER BIDS AND DIRECTING MPS TO PROVIDE STANDARD OFFER SERVICE AND NOTICE OF INQUIRY

ADAMS, Chairman; REISHUS, Commissioner

## I. SUMMARY

We reject all bids and terminate the bid process to select a retail standard offer service provider for the Maine Public Service Company's (MPS) service territory. Because bids were received from only one bidder, we find that the bids are inadequate and direct MPS to arrange and provide standard offer service to its customers for a 14 month term beginning January 1, 2007. Finally, we initiate an Inquiry to seek solutions to the problems caused by the lack of a competitive market in northern Maine.

# II. BACKGOUND

Maine's Restructuring Act directs the Commission to administer periodic bid processes to select providers of standard offer service. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3212(2). The arrangement with the current provider of standard offer service in the MPS service territory, WPS Energy Services, Inc., terminates on December 31, 2006.

Accordingly, on September 15, 2006, the Commission issued a request for proposals (RFP) to provide standard offer service to all customer classes in MPS's territory. The Commission requested bids of 26 months and 50 months for the residential and small commercial class and bids of 14 months for the medium and large classes. As required by the RFP, indicative bids were provided on October 5, 2006. After a review of bids and discussions on non-price terms, the Commission asked that final, binding bids be submitted on November 14, 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Consistent with prior practice in northern Maine, the Commission asked MPS to solicit wholesale bids on similar terms as the Commission's retail solicitation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The requested term lengths of 14 months, 26 months and 50 months were intended to change the beginning of future standard offer terms for MPS customers from January 1 to March 1 so as to be consistent with service in the territories of Central Maine Power Company and Bangor Hydro-Electric Company.

## III. DECISION

Our solicitation produced two bids from a single supplier (a 26 month bid and a 10 year bid). Participation by a single bidder is contradictory to the basic premise of the standard offer solicitation process. The process is intended to provide the benefits of competition for those customers who do not or can not obtain electricity supply directly from the competitive market. A solicitation process that yields only one bidder cannot be considered competitive and frustrates the purposes of the standard offer process. In addition, the lack of competing bids makes it extremely difficult to determine whether the prices are reasonable and in the public interest. It is for these reasons that we reject the bids and terminate our solicitation process.

Moreover, we note that the longer term bid was not in acceptable form even if submitted in a competitive context. The bid would place significant risks (i.e. fuel price and plant efficiency) on the consumers and did not sufficiently address financial security issues. The Commission's general practice is not to accept such risks in standard offer service. In addition, because we did not ask for long-term bids in this solicitation, there were no competing proposals, thus making it more difficult to accept or even analyze such a bid.<sup>3</sup>

Our standard offer rule specifies that, in the event we reject standard offer bids, we may direct the utility to provide standard offer service through contracts with wholesale providers or other appropriate arrangements. Ch. 301, § 7(D)(2). We hereby direct MPS to be the standard offer supplier for the 14 month period beginning January 1, 2007. We expect MPS to seek wholesale supply offers of varying types and provide a recommendation to the Commission as to how to proceed to minimize the ultimate cost of standard offer service to consumers. The Commission will review and approve any proposed wholesale contract for standard offer service. Given that this action will not, by itself, change market dynamics, we anticipate that a significant increase in standard offer prices will occur.

The current standard offer arrangement has been in place since March 1, 2004. In our *Order Designating Standard Office Provider in Maine Public Service Territory*, Docket No. 2003-670 (Nov. 3, 2003), we accepted a 34-month bid for all customer classes, contrary to our practice in other T&D service territories, because of our concerns about the development of a competitive generation market in northern Maine. Thus, even three years ago, we were concerned with the lack of robust competition in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Commission may seek long-term bids in a future solicitation, at which point this proposal could be resubmitted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> As mentioned above, MPS solicited wholesale bids on similar terms as required in the Commission's retail solicitation. Our view is that the potential to minimize costs to consumers will be increased if MPS has the flexibility to seek a variety of wholesale offers now that the retail solicitation has been terminated.

northern Maine. Given the comparatively small size of the load, the small number of generating facilities in northern Maine, and the lack of direct interconnection to the rest of the New England retail electricity market, it was not clear that sufficient competition would develop in northern Maine. Moreover, in recent years, there has been only one retail provider of electricity in northern Maine.

Prior to the current bid process, however, we had received bids from more than one bidder. Now that we have only one bidder, the competitive situation in northern Maine has gone from worrisome to one of obvious failure. It is no longer sufficient to wait for competitors to appear in northern Maine. We conclude that we must conduct an Inquiry to investigate possible solutions to the lack of competition in northern Maine. At a minimum, our Inquiry will include consideration of MPS owning generation assets, the cost-based regulation of generation facilities, and the viability of a direct transmission connection to other control areas. We leave open, for now, whether we will investigate whether Aroostook County has been the victim of the abuse of market power. We expect to report to the Legislature with recommendations regarding the northern Maine market in the upcoming (2007) session.

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 16<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2006.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

Karen Geraghty Administrative Director

COMMISSIONERS VOTING FOR:

Adams Reishus